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Security Update: Syria / Iraq / Iran

SYRIAN AND IRANIAN GROUND-FORCE ACTIVITY AROUND IRAQ AND KUWAIT

Executive Summary

Recent reporting describes three separate military developments that are being conflated in some news and social-media coverage:

1. Syrian military reinforcement of the Syria-Iraq border;
2. Iranian special-forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps activity along the Iran-Iraq border in the north;
3. limited Iranian armored movements in southern Khuzestan, accompanied by rhetoric proposing ground attacks against United States bases in Kuwait, Iraq or Bahrain.

These developments form part of the broader regional confrontation but do not presently constitute a coordinated conventional ground campaign.

Syria

The Syrian deployment appears primarily defensive. On 4 August, the Syrian Ministry of Defence reportedly raised military readiness to alert level “C” and directed units to deploy along the Iraqi frontier. However, the Iraqi Border Guard commander stated that the situation remained stable, that Syrian movements were known to and coordinated with Baghdad, and that Iraqi forces retained control of their side of the border. Syria and Iraq had also held formal border-security discussions in July concerning border control, intelligence cooperation and smuggling.



The Syrian action is most plausibly intended to deter Iran-backed Iraqi factions from using western Iraq as a launch area or attempting to re-establish routes through eastern Syria. Damascus has reportedly warned Baghdad that attacks launched from Iraqi territory would receive a response. Syria, Jordan and Kuwait have issued similar warnings that they may strike militia positions inside Iraq if Baghdad fails to prevent attacks against their territory.

There is no reliable evidence that Syria is preparing to invade Iraq or conduct sustained offensive ground operations. Current reporting does not establish the deployment of a complete Syrian division, a large armored force, heavy artillery formations or the logistics required for cross-border maneuver. Claims describing the movement as a major offensive concentration are therefore not supported by the available indicators.

Iran

The Iranian position in northern Iraq is materially different. An Iranian Army adviser claimed that the Army's 23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade had conducted 14 ground operations in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates during the preceding two months. According to the claim, Iranian personnel killed members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and abducted others, including two personnel reportedly seized in Sulaymaniyah in early August. The operations have not been independently confirmed by Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government or neutral observers.

Separate reporting claims that approximately 3,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Saber special-forces personnel, together with artillery, tanks, rocket launchers and reconnaissance and attack drones, have been positioned in the Iranian counties of Sardasht, Baneh, Piranshahr and Marivan. These locations face the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah sectors of Iraqi Kurdistan. The figure and equipment inventory are based on unidentified sources and remain unverified.



The northern activity nevertheless represents the clearest evidence of actual Iranian ground action associated with the present reporting. It should be understood as a series of limited reconnaissance, abduction and targeted-action missions against Iranian Kurdish interests, rather than a conventional invasion of Iraq. There is no indication that Iranian troops are attempting to seize population centres, hold territory, displace Iraqi security forces or establish a continuous Iranian-controlled zone inside Iraq.

In southern Iran, open-source imagery indicates that three T-72-series tanks were transported toward Abadan on 1 August. Three tanks do not constitute an operational armored formation (less than a troop) and were moved within the established area of responsibility of Iran's Khuzestan-based 92nd Armored Division. The movement is more consistent with local reinforcement, dispersal or defensive preparation following strikes in Khuzestan than preparation for an advance through Iraq toward Kuwait.



Local sources in Ahvaz reported that the three vehicles were traveling on Route 39 toward Abadan (Picture source: X Channel)

Iranian parliamentarian and former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki has publicly proposed a ground attack on a United States base in Iraq, Kuwait or Bahrain, followed by the capture of between 100 and 200 American personnel. This represents escalatory political rhetoric and potentially strategic signaling, but it is not evidence of an approved Iranian military plan. Media headlines suggesting that Iran is actively preparing to invade Kuwait have extrapolated from these comments and from limited or unverified vehicle movements. The observable Iranian force posture does not support that conclusion.

A conventional Iranian ground incursion into Kuwait remains very unlikely. A limited maritime infiltration, sabotage operation, proxy raid, attempted abduction or special-forces action is more credible. Kuwait's May arrest of four alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel on Bubiyan Island demonstrates the potential for a small, deniable operation, although Iran said that the personnel had entered Kuwaiti waters because of a navigation malfunction.


The most likely near-term Iranian pressure against Kuwait will continue to involve missiles, drones, covert cells and Iran-aligned Iraqi factions rather than Iranian armored or mechanized forces. The northern Iraq raids demonstrate an increased Iranian willingness to cross an international border, but they should not be interpreted as evidence that Tehran is preparing a larger ground offensive through Iraq toward Kuwait.

1. Syrian Military Activity Along the Iraqi Border

Current Deployment

On 4 August, the Syrian Ministry of Defence reportedly ordered its armed forces to enter alert status “C” and directed personnel to return to their units. Military elements were reported deploying across sections of Syria’s eastern border with Iraq, including the approaches to Al-Bukamal opposite the Iraqi district of Al-Qaim.

The Qa'im-Bukamal Borderlands



Reporting has variously attributed the forces to Syrian border units and larger army formations. However, no authoritative Syrian order of battle has been released. References in media and social-media reporting to particular Syrian divisions cannot presently be confirmed and do not demonstrate that an entire division has moved to the border.

The Iraqi Border Guard commander publicly described the situation as stable. He stated that Syrian forces were reoccupying and rebuilding their own border positions with Baghdad’s knowledge and that the two countries were continuing to exchange intelligence. Iraqi forces were described as maintaining full control of the Iraqi side of the frontier.

This is consistent with the formal Syrian-Iraqi security dialogue held in Baghdad on 6 July. During those talks, the commanders of the Syrian and Iraqi border forces discussed tighter border control, counter-smuggling measures and increased coordination. The existence of this mechanism reduces the likelihood that the latest Syrian deployment is directed against the Iraqi state.

Force Strength and Equipment

No reliable current figure is available for the number of Syrian personnel involved.

The available information confirms a broad deployment of military units but does not establish whether the movement consists of several hundred border troops, reinforced battalion groups or a larger brigade-level force. There is insufficient evidence to support claims that several thousand troops or an entire conventional division have recently concentrated in the Al-Bukamal sector.

Current reporting also does not provide verified evidence of:

- a substantial Syrian tank concentration;
- massed tube or rocket artillery;
- mobile air-defence formations;
- engineering or bridging units;
- field fuel and ammunition sites;
- field hospitals or casualty-clearing facilities;
- a logistics network capable of sustaining an advance inside Iraq.

The absence of these supporting components is important. A force intended only to occupy observation posts, control crossings and prevent infiltration can operate with infantry, light armored vehicles, drones and limited heavy weapons. A force intended to cross into Iraq and conduct sustained operations would require a much larger and more visible support structure.

Syrian Rhetoric

Damascus has reportedly informed Baghdad that any attack launched from Iraqi territory would not pass without a response. Similar messages have been attributed to Jordan and Kuwait, which have warned that they may strike militia launch sites or facilities inside Iraq if Iraqi factions attack their territory.

The rhetoric is primarily directed at Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups rather than at the Iraqi government or regular Iraqi armed forces. Damascus is attempting to establish that Iraqi sovereignty will not prevent it from acting against a militia threat if Baghdad cannot or will not suppress it.

The warning is significant because it suggests a lower Syrian threshold for limited cross-border fire, drone strikes or raids against militia positions. It does not establish an intention to conduct a broad ground offensive.

Likely Syrian Objectives

- Prevent Iran-backed Iraqi factions from moving personnel, weapons, rockets or drones through Al-Qaim and Al-Bukamal into eastern Syria.

- Deny the restoration of the former Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon logistics corridor. Al-Bukamal previously served as a critical transit point for Iranian and militia personnel and equipment moving between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
- As a deterrence. Syria is signalling that it will not allow its territory to become a permissive operating area for factions responding to United States, Israeli or Gulf operations against Iran.
- Border-state consolidation. The current Syrian government is still re-establishing permanent control over border posts and crossings. Some of the visible deployment may therefore represent the occupation of positions that had previously been vacant or only lightly held.
- Regional political alignment. By issuing warnings similar to those from Jordan and Kuwait, Damascus is positioning itself within a wider group of regional governments demanding that Baghdad prevent Iranian-aligned factions from using Iraqi territory to attack neighbouring states.

Syrian Assessment

The Syrian build-up should be assessed as a **reinforced defensive and deterrent border posture**.

There is presently no convincing evidence of Syrian preparations to invade Iraq, seize Al-Qaim or conduct sustained ground operations against the Popular Mobilization Forces. The most credible offensive possibility is a limited strike or short-duration raid against a clearly identified militia launch position, convoy or infiltration group close to the border.

News reporting describing the Syrian deployment as evidence of an imminent regional ground war is therefore overstated.

2. Iranian Ground Activity in Northern Iraq

Reported Fourteen Cross-Border Operations

On 3 August, Iranian Army adviser Brigadier General Mojtaba Jafari reportedly stated that the Iranian Army's 23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade had conducted 14 ground operations inside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during the preceding two months.

Jafari reportedly identified Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates as the operational areas. He claimed that Kurdish opposition personnel had been killed or captured and that Iranian forces had suffered no casualties. He also claimed that two Kurdish personnel were abducted from Sulaymaniyah in one of the most recent operations.

The claim is important because it constitutes an apparent Iranian acknowledgement of repeated manned activity on Iraqi territory. However, it remains a unilateral Iranian claim. The precise dates, locations, participating units, casualties and identities of those reportedly abducted have not been independently established.

It is also unclear whether all 14 incidents involved Iranian troops physically crossing the border. Iranian officials may use the term "ground operation" to describe activity conducted by Iranian intelligence personnel, local assets, affiliated Kurdish networks or proxy groups operating under Iranian direction.

The claimed participation of the regular Iranian Army's 23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade is notable. The 23rd Brigade is part of the regular armed forces rather than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, which normally conducts covert and external operations. If accurate, its involvement would indicate that responsibility for cross-border activity has expanded beyond the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and intelligence services.

Iranian Force Concentration Along the Kurdish Border

IranWire reported on 15 July that approximately 3,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Saber special-forces personnel had deployed to the Iranian border counties of Sardasht, Baneh, Piranshahr and Marivan.

The report also claimed that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Force and Aerospace Force elements had deployed tanks, artillery, Katyusha rocket launchers, reconnaissance drones and one-way attack drones. Artillery positions were reported around Gwezeh in Sardasht, Dasht-e Wazneh and the Qabre Hossein area.

These claims have not been independently verified. The reported figure of 3,000 personnel should therefore be treated as an upper-end claim rather than a confirmed strength.

The location of the reported deployments is nevertheless consistent with an Iranian focus on the Iraqi Kurdish border. Sardasht, Baneh, Piranshahr and Marivan provide access toward areas of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates where Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have maintained camps, logistics networks and political facilities.

The alleged Saber deployment and the claimed 23rd Brigade operations should not automatically be treated as the same activity. Saber is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps special-forces organization, while the 23rd Brigade belongs to the regular Iranian Army. The reporting may indicate parallel deployments by different Iranian institutions, or it may reflect confused attribution within fragmented open-source reporting.

Context and Iranian Motivation

Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in northern Iraq were reported earlier in 2026 to be preparing for possible operations inside Iran. The Kurdistan Regional Government opposed the use of its territory for attacks against Iran, while some Iranian Kurdish factions acknowledged moving personnel closer to the frontier or maintaining fighters inside Iran.

From Tehran's perspective, the Iraqi Kurdish border therefore represents a potential route for external intelligence services, Kurdish opposition parties and armed groups to infiltrate Iranian territory or support internal unrest.

The reported Iranian objectives are likely to include:

- locating and neutralising Kurdish opposition commanders;
- abducting personnel for interrogation and intelligence exploitation;
- disrupting communications and supply networks;
- deterring Kurdish groups from cooperating with the United States or Israel;

- preventing the establishment of cross-border launch or infiltration areas;
- creating an informal security buffer inside or immediately adjacent to Iraqi territory;
- demonstrating that the Kurdistan Regional Government cannot protect Iranian opposition figures.

Scale and Character of the Northern Operations

Even if the claim of 14 operations is accurate, the activity does not amount to a conventional Iranian invasion of northern Iraq.

No evidence indicates that Iranian forces have:

- occupied an Iraqi town or permanent border post;
- deployed conventional maneuver battalions inside Iraq;
- established defended positions on Iraqi territory;
- attempted to replace Peshmerga or Iraqi federal forces;
- brought substantial artillery or armored forces across the border;
- created a permanent Iranian logistics route inside the Kurdistan Region.

The reported operations more closely resemble special-forces reconnaissance, targeted killing, abduction and intelligence missions. They are likely to involve small teams crossing briefly, operating with local intelligence support and withdrawing after completing a specific task.

This is still a significant violation of Iraqi sovereignty. It demonstrates that Iran may be willing to conduct manned operations beyond its border when it perceives Kurdish opposition activity as an immediate national-security threat.

However, it should not be used as evidence that Iranian conventional forces are beginning a wider ground campaign across Iraq.

3. Iranian Military Activity in Southern Khuzestan

Observed Armored Movement

On 1 August, open-source imagery showed three T-72M or T-72M1 tanks being transported south along the Ahvaz-Abadan highway toward Abadan. The tanks were carried on heavy equipment transporters rather than moving as part of a tactical armored column.

The vehicles were assessed as belonging to the regular Iranian Army's 92nd Armored Division, which is already responsible for the defence of Khuzestan Province.

The movement placed the vehicles closer to Abadan, Khorramshahr, the Shalamchek crossing, the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the approaches to southern Iraq. However, the geographic direction of travel does not by itself demonstrate offensive intent.

Three tanks represent less than a platoon-sized element and have negligible independent offensive value. They cannot conduct sustained operations without infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, air defence, engineers, maintenance, fuel, ammunition and recovery support.

Most Likely Explanation

The most likely explanations are local reinforcement, equipment dispersal, protection of critical infrastructure or preparation to defend against a possible United States or Israeli ground or special-forces operation in Khuzestan.

Khuzestan contains strategic oilfields, pipelines, refineries, ports and border crossings. Iranian military sites and the Shalamchah crossing have also been exposed to strikes during the conflict, providing a direct defensive reason to reposition armor in the area.

The observed movement is therefore consistent with defensive positioning inside Iran. It is not evidence of preparation to cross Iraq and invade Kuwait.

Missing Offensive Indicators

A serious Iranian plan to move conventional forces toward Kuwait would require preparations on a much larger scale.

Expected indicators would include:

- movement of multiple armored and mechanized battalions;
- concentration of hundreds of armored vehicles rather than three tanks;
- deployment of self-propelled and towed artillery;
- mobile air-defence systems;
- combat-engineer and bridging equipment;
- fuel tankers and ammunition transporters;
- vehicle-recovery and maintenance elements;
- field hospitals and medical-evacuation facilities;
- route-security forces inside southern Iraq;
- prior coordination with, or coercion of, Iraqi security forces;
- preparation of staging areas around Shalamchah, Basra and Safwan;
- efforts to suppress United States and Kuwaiti air power.

None of these indicators has been credibly reported at the scale required for a conventional operation.

4. Iranian Rhetoric Concerning Kuwait and United States Bases

Former Iranian foreign minister and current parliamentarian Manouchehr Mottaki has repeatedly proposed that Iran conduct a ground attack against a United States base in the region and capture American personnel.

On 15 July, he proposed attacking a base and capturing 100 Americans. On 19 July, he stated on Iranian television that Iran could seize a base in Iraq, Kuwait or Bahrain and capture approximately 200 American personnel to force Washington to halt its campaign.

The remarks are serious because they were made by a former foreign minister and serving member of parliament. They contribute to a broader Iranian narrative that United States bases in Gulf states are legitimate extensions of American territory and therefore lawful targets from Tehran's perspective.

However, the comments remain a proposal by a political figure. They have not been accompanied by:

- an official operational announcement from the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff;
- a formal directive from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;
- a declared government decision;
- observable deployment of an assault force;
- evidence of detailed preparations against a particular base;
- movement of the airlift, amphibious or ground logistics needed to seize and hold an installation.

Reports stating that Tehran is “seriously preparing” or “actively planning” an invasion of Kuwait therefore go beyond the available evidence. Some reporting has explicitly acknowledged that alleged Iranian movements toward Kuwait could not be independently verified.

The rhetoric is more likely intended to deter United States attacks, pressure Kuwait to restrict American operations, frighten Gulf governments and signal that Iran retains unconventional escalation options.

5. Potential Iranian Ground Action Against Kuwait

Conventional Overland Incursion

Iran has no direct land border with Kuwait. Any conventional Iranian force would have to cross southern Iraq before reaching Kuwait.

This would require either Iraqi government cooperation, the collapse of Iraqi border control or direct Iranian combat against Iraqi forces. A large Iranian column would then have to move through exposed terrain in Basra Province and approach the Kuwaiti border under United States and Kuwaiti surveillance and air power.

Such an operation would be difficult to conceal, difficult to sustain and vulnerable to interdiction. It would also transform the conflict by making Iran an overt occupying force inside Iraq and by threatening a state protected by substantial United States military infrastructure.

A conventional overland Iranian incursion into Kuwait is therefore assessed as very unlikely.

Air Assault Against a United States Base

Mottaki has referred to helicopter landings and the capture of United States personnel. Iran possesses helicopters and special-forces units capable of limited air-assault activity, but a long-range operation against a defended base in Kuwait would face severe problems.

Iranian helicopters would have to cross the Gulf or transit Iraqi airspace, evade radar and air defences, land close to a prepared United States facility, secure captives and then extract them through contested airspace.

Such a mission would carry a high probability of failure and the loss of the assault force. It is more plausible as coercive rhetoric than as a practical operational concept.

Limited Infiltration or Sabotage

A limited infiltration remains more credible.

In May, Kuwait announced the arrest of four alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel after an armed encounter on Bubiyan Island. One Kuwaiti service member was reportedly wounded. Iran acknowledged that Iranian personnel had entered Kuwaiti waters but said the incident resulted from a navigation malfunction.

Regardless of the competing explanations, the incident illustrates the potential for a small Iranian or Iran-linked team to approach Kuwait by sea.

More plausible limited scenarios include:

- insertion of reconnaissance or sabotage personnel;
- attacks against border infrastructure;
- infiltration of drone teams;
- attempts to abduct isolated military or contractor personnel;
- placement of surveillance equipment;
- support to local or Iraqi-based clandestine cells;
- attacks on logistics routes near Abdali or Bubiyan Island.

These operations would not require the conventional indicators associated with an invasion and could be conducted with greater deniability.

6. Relationship Between the Syrian and Iranian Fronts

The Syrian and Iranian developments are linked strategically but are not parts of a single coordinated ground offensive.

Syria is attempting to prevent Iraqi militias aligned with Iran from attacking Syrian territory or restoring an Iranian logistics corridor through Al-Bukamal.

Iran's activity in northern Iraq is directed against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and possible external support networks.

Iran's southern posture is principally defensive, while its offensive pressure against Kuwait continues to rely primarily on missiles, drones, covert activity and Iraqi proxies.

The fronts may interact indirectly. For example, an Iran-backed Iraqi militia attack against Syria could trigger a Syrian strike inside Iraq. An Iranian operation against Kurdish groups could provoke Peshmerga, Iraqi federal or United States involvement. An attack against Kuwait launched from southern Iraq could prompt Kuwait or the United States to strike militia facilities in Basra or elsewhere.

The main regional danger is therefore escalation through overlapping limited operations, rather than the launch of a single conventional ground campaign.

7. Likely Future Scenarios

Continued Syrian Border Reinforcement — High Likelihood

Syria is likely to maintain an elevated military presence around Al-Bukamal and other eastern border areas. Baghdad will probably continue deploying Iraqi Border Guards, army units and state-controlled Popular Mobilization Forces elements to prevent unauthorized factional movement.

The Syrian deployment will remain primarily defensive unless an attack is launched from Iraqi territory.

Limited Syrian Strike Against an Iraqi Militia — Moderate Likelihood

If a rocket, drone or armed group crosses from Iraq, Syria may conduct a limited strike against the launch point, convoy or nearby militia facility.

Such an operation would probably be geographically restricted and intended to establish deterrence rather than initiate a sustained campaign inside Iraq.

Further Iranian Special-Forces Operations in Iraqi Kurdistan — Moderate to High Likelihood

If the claim of 14 previous operations is broadly accurate, Iran is likely to continue short-duration raids, abductions and intelligence operations against selected Kurdish opposition personnel.

Iran may also use artillery, drones or missiles against camps and suspected staging areas while avoiding permanent occupation of Iraqi territory.

Increased Iraqi and Kurdish Border Security — High Likelihood

The Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi federal authorities are likely to increase checkpoints, patrols and surveillance along the Iranian frontier to prevent both Iranian incursions and Kurdish opposition movements toward Iran.

Baghdad will seek to demonstrate that Iraqi territory is not being used against neighbouring states while avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran.

Continued Iranian Missile and Drone Pressure Against Kuwait — High Likelihood

Missiles and drones remain Iran's most effective means of striking United States and Kuwaiti facilities without exposing large ground formations.

Iran can also use Iraqi launch areas, militia cells and deniable organizations to complicate attribution and increase pressure on Baghdad.

Further Maritime or Covert Infiltration Into Kuwait — Moderate Likelihood

Small-scale reconnaissance, sabotage or infiltration activity is more plausible than an overt Iranian ground attack.

Bubiyan Island, northern Kuwaiti border infrastructure, isolated coastal facilities and logistics routes may remain areas of concern.

Limited Iran-Aligned Militia Raid From Southern Iraq — Low Likelihood

A small Iraqi faction could attempt a brief cross-border raid, attack an isolated border post or target logistics infrastructure near Abdali.

Such an operation would probably be intended for propaganda, hostage-taking or sabotage rather than territorial occupation. It would carry a high risk of Kuwaiti, Iraqi and United States retaliation.

Iranian Conventional Ground Incursion Into Kuwait — Very Low Likelihood

There is currently no observable conventional force package capable of conducting such an operation.

The movement of three tanks toward Abadan, political calls for hostage-taking and unverified reports of additional armored vehicles do not constitute evidence of invasion preparations.

This assessment would change only if Iran began moving multiple brigades, artillery, air defences, engineers and logistics forces toward the southern Iraqi corridor, accompanied by Iraqi militia mobilization around Basra and Safwan.

8. Warning Indicators

The following developments would represent a material change in the assessment:

- movement of large Syrian armored or artillery formations toward Al-Bukamal;
- establishment of Syrian forward logistics sites close to the Iraqi border;
- Syrian or Iraqi closure of the Al-Qaim-Al-Bukamal crossing;
- verified Syrian strikes on militia positions inside Iraq;
- independent confirmation of Iranian Army units operating inside Erbil or Sulaymaniyah governorates;
- establishment of permanent Iranian positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan;

- movement of additional Iranian armored brigades toward Abadan or Khorramshahr;
- deployment of Iranian bridging, engineering and mobile air-defence units near Shalamcheh;
- large militia movements toward Basra, Safwan or the Kuwait border;
- preparation of fuel, ammunition and medical facilities in southern Iraq;
- evacuation or major reinforcement of Camp Arifjan, Camp Buehring or Ali Al Salem Air Base;
- unusual Iranian helicopter concentrations in Khuzestan;
- Iranian naval landing craft concentrating in the northern Gulf;
- closure or militarization of routes between Shalamcheh, Basra and Safwan.

Overall Outlook

The additional reporting concerning 14 Iranian cross-border operations materially changes the understanding of Iran's northern posture. It indicates that limited Iranian ground activity inside Iraq may already be occurring and that Tehran is prepared to violate Iraqi sovereignty to pursue Iranian Kurdish opposition personnel.

It does not materially increase the assessed likelihood of a conventional Iranian ground operation toward Kuwait.

The northern operations are specialised, short-duration counter-opposition actions focused on Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. They require small teams, intelligence support and limited logistics. An invasion of Kuwait would require a large, sustained and highly visible combined-arms effort across southern Iraq.

Likewise, the Syrian deployment should be considered separately. Syria is reinforcing its own frontier against militia threats and attempting to prevent attacks or infiltration from Iraq. Iraqi statements that the deployment is coordinated and that the border remains stable argue strongly against interpretations of an imminent Syrian offensive.

The most important analytical conclusion is therefore that **some limited ground operations are credible, but reports implying preparations for broad conventional ground warfare are not supported by the current indicators.**

The most likely near-term pattern is continued Syrian border reinforcement, further Iranian raids against Kurdish opposition interests, missile and drone attacks against Kuwait, and possible covert or proxy activity from Iraqi territory.

The risk of miscalculation remains substantial. A limited militia attack or Iranian cross-border raid could trigger retaliation inside Iraq and produce a wider confrontation. However, neither Syria nor Iran has presently assembled the forces required for a sustained conventional ground offensive across Iraq.