



INSIGHT PAPER

PEACE THROUGH FEDERAL ORDER

A Realistic Ten-Point Settlement for Myanmar

CORE ASSESSMENT

Myanmar is most likely to achieve durable peace through a decentralised federal order built from the state and township level upward. The Union should remain strong in functions that genuinely require national control, while constitutionally protected local institutions govern most daily public life. The Tatmadaw would survive as a national defence institution but surrender political guardianship; resistance forces would gain real local authority while accepting one Union and an eventual common constitutional security framework.

Executive Summary

Myanmar's war is often described as a contest between military rule and democracy. That description is incomplete. The February 2021 coup created the present nationwide war, but the deeper conflict is older: the state has never settled a durable division of power between the centre and the country's ethnic regions, while the Tatmadaw has repeatedly treated itself as the institution entitled to decide when the political system is failing. A workable peace therefore has to solve two problems at the same time - the military's claim to political guardianship and the long-running centre-periphery dispute over local authority, security, land, identity and natural resources.

The central argument of this paper is that decentralised federal government should not be treated as one item in a peace agreement. It should be the organising principle of the entire settlement. Myanmar is too diverse, too heavily armed and too distrustful of central authority for durable stability to rest on an attempt to reconstruct a highly centralised state from Naypyitaw. Equally, the country is too strategically exposed and economically interdependent to function safely as a loose collection of armed territories. The realistic middle ground is a federal Union in which substantial governing power belongs constitutionally to states and local institutions, while a limited but capable Union government retains the functions that genuinely require national coordination.

This is not an argument for importing a Western model of government. The settlement proposed here does not make liberal democracy, rapid national elections, a particular party system or a foreign constitutional template a precondition for peace. Its immediate objective is more basic and more practical: stop the war; establish enforceable rules; restore law and order; give local communities governing institutions they recognise; create predictable courts, police and taxation; prevent armed groups from financing themselves through uncontrolled war economies; and ensure that the national military cannot again displace the political order by force. Political competition and elections matter, but they should follow the creation of a secure institutional framework rather than substitute for it.

The approach also draws on Myanmar's own political history. The Panglong Agreement signed on 12 February 1947 by Aung San and Shan, Kachin and Chin representatives accepted in principle 'full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas'. It was not a complete national settlement - several important peoples were not parties to it - but it established an indigenous principle that unity did not require uniform administration. The failure to turn that principle into a stable, inclusive and enforceable division of authority is one of the threads running through Myanmar's subsequent conflict. [1]

The 2008 Constitution partially decentralised administration by creating state and region governments, but it left them weak in fiscal and administrative terms and preserved the Tatmadaw as a constitutional political actor. It reserved one quarter of legislative seats for serving military personnel, placed key security ministries under military nomination, and gave the armed forces an effective veto over major constitutional amendments. Research on subnational government before the coup concluded that decentralisation remained limited and imbalanced and that peace was intrinsically linked to a stronger subnational governance system. [2][3]

The present moment is not favourable in the sense of imminent peace, but it is more negotiable than at several points since 2021. The military survived severe battlefield reverses, activated conscription and improved its use of drones and air power; resistance forces, meanwhile, retain major territorial and administrative positions and cannot realistically be eliminated nationwide. The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), formally established on 30 March 2026, stated on 15 July that it remained committed to achieving a negotiated political solution. Reuters reported on 5 August that Myanmar may have entered an early 'talks about talks' phase, although President Min Aung Hlaing's government had still not recognised SCEF as a collective negotiating counterpart. [4][5][6]

The institutional setting has also changed. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won the three-phase election conducted between 28 December 2025 and 25 January 2026; voting did not occur in all townships and the National League for Democracy had been dissolved. Min Aung Hlaing left active military command on 30 March 2026, General Ye Win Oo became commander-in-chief, and parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing president on 3 April by 429 votes to 126. The arrangement has not produced genuine civilian control, but the

formal separation between the presidency and military command provides a mechanism that a settlement could convert into a real constitutional separation. [7][8][9]

The ten-point settlement proposed here therefore makes a trade. The Tatmadaw keeps institutional existence, a national defence role, pensions and a place for professional officers who are not excluded by serious-crime vetting, but it gives up political supremacy and routine control of local government. Resistance organisations obtain constitutionally protected federal and local authority, a meaningful share of resource revenues, local policing and security arrangements, and phased rather than immediate disarmament; in return, they accept the continued existence of one Union, one eventual national defence framework and the end of permanent party armies. China and ASEAN do not dictate Myanmar's political model. They guarantee sequence, ceasefire compliance, border stability, humanitarian access, normalisation and reconstruction incentives.

Central Assessment. Peace is most likely to endure if the settlement is built from the township and state level upward. The Union should be strong in the functions that must be national and deliberately limited in the functions that can be governed locally. Strong government and decentralised government are not opposites: the objective is strong institutions at the correct level, backed by predictable law and a clear monopoly on legitimate coercive force.



Purpose, Approach and Evidentiary Standard

This paper is a policy proposal, not a forecast that the parties are close to signing such an agreement. Factual claims have been checked against primary documents where available - including the Panglong Agreement, the 2008 Constitution, the Federal Democracy Charter, ASEAN statements, United Nations material and SCEF statements - and cross-checked against Reuters reporting on current political, military and diplomatic developments. Where territorial control, casualty numbers or armed-group strength cannot be reliably measured, the paper avoids false precision. Proposed powers, percentages, timelines and institutional mechanisms are recommendations for negotiation, not claims about existing agreements.

The draft intentionally uses an order-and-institutions test rather than an ideological test. A proposed institution is included because it is necessary to prevent renewed conflict, deliver public authority or create predictable relationships between the centre and local communities. The minimum normative floor is narrow but non-negotiable: civilians may not be deliberately targeted; detention and punishment require lawful process; local

minorities must be protected from domination by local majorities; property and commercial rules must be sufficiently predictable for ordinary economic life; and grave international crimes cannot be erased by a political bargain. Those are practical foundations of stable government as much as legal principles.

The Conflict Myanmar Actually Has to Resolve

The 2021 coup was the trigger, not the whole cause

The immediate chain of events is clear. In the general election of 8 November 2020, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 80 percent of contested parliamentary seats. The military and the military-backed USDP alleged widespread electoral irregularities. Myanmar's election commission rejected the military's claims that the result should be overturned, and independent election-monitoring groups did not find evidence of mass fraud capable of changing the outcome. In the final days of January 2021, negotiations between the civilian authorities and military representatives failed. On 1 February - hours before the new parliament was due to sit - the Tatmadaw detained Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other political leaders and transferred power to Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing under a declared state of emergency. [10][11]

The electoral dispute was therefore the immediate justification, but it was not the deeper institutional cause. The Tatmadaw entered the 2020 election with extensive constitutional power already protected. Its concern was not simply whether an NLD government could govern day-to-day; it was whether repeated electoral defeats and continued civilian pressure for constitutional change would progressively reduce the military's role as the final arbiter of the state. The coup represented the military's decision that preserving that role mattered more than preserving the existing civil-military compromise.



Figure 1. Aung San Suu Kyi political campaign imagery from Myanmar's pre-coup political period. (Source: Instagram)

The older conflict is about who governs the periphery and on what terms

Myanmar's centre-periphery problem predates independence. The Panglong Agreement of 12 February 1947 was an attempt to bridge the political systems of 'Ministerial Burma' and the Frontier Areas as Britain prepared to leave. Aung San negotiated with Shan, Kachin and Chin representatives; Karen representatives were present only as observers and other communities were not fully represented. Clause 5 accepted full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas in principle. [1] The agreement did not settle every constitutional issue, but it matters because the principle of locally held authority is not a recent Western import: it was part of the bargain under which important frontier leaders agreed to join the emerging Union.

Independence on 4 January 1948 did not produce a settled Union. Armed conflict with ethnic organisations developed across multiple frontiers, alongside communist insurgency and political instability. The Tatmadaw increasingly came to see national unity and territorial integrity as military responsibilities. General Ne Win's coup on 2 March 1962 entrenched a highly centralised state and decades of direct or indirect military rule. From the military's perspective, central control was the answer to fragmentation. From the perspective of many ethnic movements, central control became evidence that promises of equality and autonomy could not be trusted. The two narratives reinforced each other for generations.

This helps explain why ceasefires repeatedly failed to become political settlements. Agreements often stopped fighting in a particular area without settling who had legitimate authority over police, courts, schools, land, mining, taxation or armed forces. The 15 October 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) created useful mechanisms for ceasefire monitoring and political dialogue, but only eight ethnic armed organisations signed at the outset and the underlying federal question remained unresolved. [12]

The 2008 system decentralised administration without transferring enough power

The 2008 Constitution created seven states and seven regions with their own governments and legislatures, plus self-administered areas. This was a meaningful departure from earlier centralised structures. But it did not create a strong federation. Chief ministers were appointed through a centrally dominated system; township administration retained a strong Union presence; state and region governments had limited independent fiscal capacity; and the military retained positions in state and region legislatures and security administration. The Asia Foundation's 2018 assessment concluded that political decentralisation had advanced further than administrative and fiscal decentralisation and that the overall system remained limited and imbalanced. [2]

At national level the structural military privileges were more consequential. The Constitution reserved 25 percent of seats in both Union chambers for military appointees, required more than 75 percent support to amend key provisions, and thereby gave the military bloc an effective veto. The commander-in-chief nominated serving military personnel for the Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs portfolios. Emergency provisions allowed sovereign powers to be transferred to the commander-in-chief. [3] This meant the Tatmadaw was not merely the state's defence institution; it was embedded as a separate political power centre inside the constitutional system.

The post-coup war merged the Bamar political crisis with the ethnic federal question

The repression of mass protests after 1 February 2021 transformed the conflict. Armed resistance spread into Bamar-majority areas that had not previously experienced insurgency on the same scale. People's Defence Forces emerged alongside long-established ethnic armies. The National Unity Government (NUG), formed in April 2021 by elected lawmakers and other anti-coup actors, adopted the Federal Democracy Charter as its constitutional framework. The Charter had been declared on 31 March 2021 and was amended and ratified by the First People's Assembly of 27-29 January 2022. [13] The political significance was considerable: opposition to military rule and ethnic demands for federalism increasingly became part of the same national struggle, even though command structures and political objectives remained fragmented.



Figure 2. Anti-coup protest imagery reflecting public hostility toward military rule. (Source: Instagram)



Figure 3. People's Defence Force personnel operating in a rural area. (Source: Instagram)

The anti-military coalition has never been uniform. Some ethnic organisations cooperate closely with the NUG; others preserve strategic distance; several maintain strong bilateral relationships with China; and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), United Wa State Army (UWSA), MNDAA, TNLA and various Shan organisations have distinct political objectives. A realistic settlement must therefore avoid the fiction that 'the resistance' is one party capable of delivering every armed actor. The process requires a collective core plus separate seats or annexes for indispensable organisations that will not delegate their authority.

The 2026 Strategic Setting

Neither side can safely plan on a decisive victory

Operation 1027, launched in late October 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, exposed serious Tatmadaw vulnerabilities. Resistance and ethnic forces seized important border crossings, bases and towns; in August 2024 the military lost its Northeastern Command headquarters at Lashio, an unprecedented reverse. China subsequently brokered arrangements that reduced fighting in the northeast, including a January 2025 ceasefire between the military and MNDAA, and sent a monitoring team in April 2025. [14][15] These developments demonstrated both the military's vulnerability and China's unusually direct leverage over northern battlefields.

The Tatmadaw nevertheless adapted. It activated compulsory service in February 2024, expanded low-cost drone and paramotor use, altered tactical methods and recovered some ground. Reuters' 5 August 2026 assessment described the military as being on an improved trajectory compared with the period when collapse was widely discussed, while also emphasising that it remained engaged in a nationwide war against numerous armed formations. [6] The resistance therefore has enough power to deny a simple military restoration of the pre-coup state, but not enough unity or demonstrated capacity to guarantee destruction of the Tatmadaw. That is the strategic condition in which negotiations can become rational without being surrender.



Figure 4. Resistance Force personnel take a break during Operation 1111. (Source: Instagram)



Figure 5. Myanmar military personnel during a formal parade, illustrating the continuing institutional identity of the Tatmadaw. (Source: Instagram)

The 2025-26 election changed titles but did not settle legitimacy

The military authorities held elections in three phases on 28 December 2025, 11 January 2026 and 25 January 2026. Voting took place in 263 of Myanmar's 330 townships and was cancelled in many conflict areas. Reuters reported that the USDP won 232 of the 263 lower-house seats contested and 109 of 157 upper-house seats announced by 30 January. The NLD had been dissolved, significant opposition was excluded or chose not to participate, and ASEAN declined to endorse the process. [7] The election created state institutions with administrative weight, but it did not create a national consensus about political legitimacy.

On 30 March 2026, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as commander-in-chief and General Ye Win Oo, formerly a senior intelligence official and a close military loyalist, took command of the armed forces. Parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing president on 3 April by 429 votes to 126. [8][9] The separation is formal rather than proof of civilian supremacy, but it offers a potentially useful transition mechanism: a settlement can preserve the offices of president and commander-in-chief while rewriting the legal relationship between them, rather than demanding that the entire state hierarchy be abolished in a single step.



Figure 6. Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing during his 2026 political transition. (Source: Instagram)

A negotiating opening exists, but formal talks have not begun

SCEF was formally established on 30 March 2026 by the NUG, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karenni representation. Its founding announcement retained maximalist revolutionary objectives, including ending military participation in politics and building a federal union. [4] More significant for negotiation, its statement of 15 July after consultations with Thai and Philippine foreign ministers said it remained committed to achieving a negotiated political solution and identified the need for preparation on objectives, participation, sequencing, implementation and guarantees. [5]

Reuters reported on 5 August that SCEF spokesperson Saw Nimrod said the organisation was open to dialogue and political negotiation while maintaining civilian supremacy as its end state. President Min Aung Hlaing's government had not recognised SCEF as an interlocutor and preferred bilateral discussions with individual armed groups. [6] Thailand has pushed for gradual re-engagement and has emphasised reducing violence, expanding humanitarian access and containing spillover. ASEAN's July 2026 foreign ministers' communique reaffirmed the Five-Point Consensus as its main reference, called for inclusive dialogue and humanitarian access, and noted engagement by Philippine Foreign Secretary and ASEAN Special Envoy Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro. [16][17]

The opening remains fragile. Myanmar's foreign ministry said on 10 August that an ASEAN special envoy was no longer necessary after the election, while ASEAN continued to insist that the underlying crisis was unresolved. [18] This underlines why a peace plan cannot rely on goodwill. It requires concrete exchanges, external leverage and a sequence in which no side is asked to make an irreversible concession before the other has performed.

The Governing Principle: Federal Order, Not Constitutional Idealism

The settlement should be judged by whether it produces a peaceful and governable country, not by whether its institutions resemble a preferred foreign model. Myanmar needs a political architecture that its armed actors can live with and that ordinary communities can use. The key concept is federal order: a legal division of authority in which local government is strong enough to govern daily life, while the Union is strong enough to maintain territorial integrity, a common market, currency, external relations and national defence.

This is different from simple administrative decentralisation. A ministry in Naypyitaw delegating tasks to a local office can withdraw those tasks later. Federal power is constitutionally owned at the state or local level. It can be changed only through an agreed constitutional procedure. That distinction matters because the conflict is fundamentally about trust. Ethnic administrations will not demobilise merely because the centre promises to administer them more sensitively. They need to know which powers the centre no longer possesses.

Practical test. If a matter can be governed effectively at state, township or municipal level without threatening the Union, the presumption should be that it belongs there. Naypyitaw should have to justify central control, rather than local authorities having to petition for permission to govern their own routine affairs.

What a Strong Federal State Would Actually Mean

Practical Allocation of Government Responsibilities

Union. Primary responsibilities: National defence; foreign affairs; currency and central banking; inter-state commerce; major customs standards; national civil aviation; strategic energy/grid coordination; national transport corridors; national citizenship framework; federal criminal offences; macro-fiscal policy. *Limits: Routine local policing; school language; municipal services; ordinary land administration; local licensing; most local roads; ordinary public-order deployment; day-to-day state natural-resource management.*

State / federal unit. Primary responsibilities: Police and public order; state courts for ordinary offences; education and language policy; health administration; land and local natural-resource licensing; state roads; agriculture; local economic regulation; cultural affairs; state taxes and budget; emergency management. *Limits: Independent foreign*

policy; separate currency; offensive armed forces; unilateral international border policy; customs barriers against other states.

Township / municipal. Primary responsibilities: Local administration; permits; markets; sanitation; local roads; water; local public safety; community dispute mechanisms integrated with formal courts; local development priorities. *Limits: Independent armed formations; taxation outside statutory powers; detention outside law; private tolls or armed checkpoints.*

The centre would therefore be smaller in scope than the historic Myanmar state but stronger within its defined functions. A Union government that no longer attempts to command every township can focus resources on defence, currency, infrastructure, trade, border frameworks and national fiscal stability. A state government that genuinely controls police, courts, education, local revenue and development can be held responsible by its own population for whether law and order actually works. This is the opposite of state weakness: it clarifies who is responsible for what.

The principle should also be asymmetrical. Myanmar's states, regions and self-administered territories do not have equal histories, capacities, armed structures or economic bases. A rigid one-size-fits-all federation would create new conflict. The permanent constitution should establish a guaranteed minimum of state powers, while allowing additional negotiated arrangements for territories such as Rakhine, Wa-administered areas, Kokang and other places where existing political-military structures cannot realistically be dissolved overnight. Asymmetry is not necessarily a weakness if the Union's core rules remain clear.

What the Settlement Deliberately Does Not Require

A realistic Myanmar agreement should avoid turning the peace process into an ideological reconstruction programme. External actors can support technical capacity, but the political order must be rooted in Myanmar's own bargains, institutions and security realities. The following are therefore deliberately not prerequisites for the ceasefire or first transitional phase:

- No requirement for an immediate nationwide election. Elections held before armed actors accept the rules, local administrations function and citizens can participate without coercion would risk legitimising whichever side controls each locality rather than settling the war.
- No requirement that the Tatmadaw be dissolved. Myanmar will continue to need a national defence institution. The settlement changes the military's constitutional role and command relationship; it does not pretend the country can be governed without armed forces.
- No requirement that EAOs and PDFs surrender weapons before political guarantees exist. Force registration, separation and heavy-weapon controls should precede gradual integration or demobilisation.
- No requirement for identical state institutions. States should be free to select locally appropriate executive and legislative arrangements within agreed federal limits, including different methods of choosing chief ministers or state executives if those arrangements are locally legitimate and rule-bound.
- No requirement that Western states act as guarantors. The hard external guarantees should come principally from ASEAN, Thailand and China because they possess geographic proximity, economic leverage and direct relationships with Myanmar actors. The UN and ICRC can provide technical and humanitarian functions.
- No assumption that political legitimacy comes only from national electoral competition. During transition it will also derive from the ability of institutions to provide security, justice, services and predictable administration. Elections become the mechanism for long-term political renewal once those institutions exist.

There are still limits. 'Local leadership' cannot mean an armed commander possesses unlimited authority because his organisation controls the ground. Strong local government requires known rules, budgets, courts, police chains of command, complaint mechanisms and succession arrangements. Otherwise decentralisation merely replaces one central coercive system with multiple local coercive systems. The distinction between federalism and warlordism is institutionalisation.

A Myanmar Federal Model Designed for Stability

State authority should be constitutional, not delegated

The permanent settlement should contain two protected lists: exclusive Union powers and exclusive state/federal-unit powers. A third concurrent list would cover areas such as environmental regulation, major infrastructure, disaster response and organised crime. If a competence is not listed, the presumption should favour the state rather than the Union during the first constitutional period. This would reverse the historic bias toward centralisation and make the federal bargain visible in day-to-day government.

State chief ministers should no longer be appointed at the Union president's discretion. Each state should be able to establish a locally legitimate method for selecting its executive - for example selection by the state legislature, direct election, or a mixed council arrangement - provided the method is written into the state constitution and meets basic requirements for peaceful succession and financial accountability. This is an area where uniformity is unnecessary.

Fiscal power must match political responsibility

A state that is expected to maintain police, courts, schools, clinics and roads must have predictable revenue. Myanmar's pre-coup decentralisation suffered because political responsibilities were not matched by equivalent administrative and fiscal authority. [2] The settlement should therefore give states constitutionally protected tax bases - including property, land-use, vehicle, local business and selected consumption taxes - plus formula-based transfers from the Union.

Natural-resource revenue requires an explicit bargain because control over jade, timber, rare earths, hydrocarbons and hydropower has long intersected with armed conflict and centre-periphery mistrust. Research before the coup noted that ethnic leaders in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan areas had repeatedly demanded greater control and revenue sharing, while also warning that poorly designed revenue sharing can create corruption and local conflict. [19] A useful negotiating starting point would be a 40/40/20 formula for production-linked royalties and rents: 40 percent retained in the producing state, 40 percent to the Union, and 20 percent to a national equalisation fund for poorer states and regions. The final percentages should be negotiated sector by sector rather than treated as immutable constitutional figures.

All major extractive contracts should be registered in a common national database, audited independently and subject to state-level disclosure. Neither a Union ministry nor an armed local administration should be able to fund itself through off-budget concessions. This is an essential law-and-order measure: peace will not hold if commanders can finance private armies from opaque mining, timber, border-tax or narcotics revenues.

Local law and order should be local - but professional

Ordinary policing should become primarily a state function. This would be one of the most important practical changes in the settlement because local communities would no longer experience the Union military or a centrally controlled security bureaucracy as the default face of government. State police services should be recruited locally, operate in local languages where appropriate, and answer to state civilian authorities. They should have common training and evidentiary standards so that an arrest in Kachin, Karenni or Rakhine is legally recognisable across the Union.

Township police commanders should have operational authority over ordinary crime, traffic, markets, public disorder and local investigations. Organised crime crossing state boundaries, terrorism affecting multiple states, trafficking networks and offences against Union institutions would fall to a Federal Criminal Investigation Service with joint state-federal tasking. This creates a layered security system rather than simply replacing one monopoly with fourteen isolated police forces.

Courts should follow the same logic. State courts should handle ordinary criminal, civil, family, land and commercial disputes under state law. A Federal Constitutional Court should adjudicate centre-state competence disputes and fundamental federal guarantees. A Federal Supreme Court should handle Union law and final appellate issues defined by the constitution. Customary mechanisms may continue for minor civil and community disputes

where communities choose them, but detention, serious criminal punishment and property confiscation should require formal legal authority.

The Ten-Point Peace Settlement

The ten points below are designed as a single exchange rather than a list of aspirations. Each major concession by one side is paired with a concession or guarantee by another. The key sequencing rule is that irreversible military steps occur only after political and institutional steps that make them safe.

1. A 30-Day Local Stability and Civilian-Protection Pact

Within seven days of a Framework Declaration, participating parties would enter a 30-day renewable stability period. The Tatmadaw would halt offensive air strikes, paramotor and gyrocopter bombing, naval fire and heavy artillery against populated locations and civilian infrastructure except where immediately necessary to repel an attack on a declared military position. Resistance organisations would halt attacks directed at civilians, assassinations of non-combatant officials, forced recruitment, punitive attacks on communities accused of collaboration and indiscriminate attacks in urban areas. All sides would prohibit attacks on hospitals, schools, religious sites, markets, displacement camps and humanitarian facilities.



Figure 7. Major conflict destruction visible on 1 July 2026, illustrating the continuing civilian cost of the war. (Source: Instagram)

This first stage should be localised rather than dependent on simultaneous nationwide compliance. A township or corridor that meets the standard should receive ceasefire benefits even if another sector remains contested. That prevents one spoiler from vetoing the whole process and allows peace to expand geographically. Each participating state or theatre would establish a Local Stability Committee comprising military, resistance, community and religious representatives with an ASEAN/Thai observer.



*Figure 8. Urban conflict damage in Myanmar, highlighting the reconstruction and law-and-order challenge that would follow a ceasefire.
(Source: Instagram)*

The government's immediate confidence-building measure would be a first tranche of detainee releases: minors, the seriously ill, humanitarian workers, journalists and people detained solely for non-violent political activity. Both sides would provide confidential detention lists to the ICRC and permit access arrangements. The resistance would provide equivalent information on military prisoners and civilian detainees in its custody.

2. Recognition of a Collective Negotiating Structure Without Pretending the Resistance Is Unified

Naypyitaw would formally accept SCEF as a collective negotiating counterpart. This would be a significant concession because bilateral talks with individual EAOs give the state greater ability to divide adversaries and redeploy forces between theatres. Recognition would not mean that the government accepts SCEF's final programme, nor that SCEF becomes the sole opposition representative.

SCEF would reciprocally accept separate or issue-specific participation by organisations that are militarily indispensable but politically distinct, including the ULA/AA, MNDAA, TNLA, UWSA and relevant Shan organisations. A Civilian and Local Governance Forum would run alongside the armed-party talks, including state political parties, women's organisations, business and labour representatives, religious and community leaders, Rohingya representatives and displaced communities. The settlement should not be negotiated only by men with armed forces.

The process would have three working bodies: a Federal Political Commission; a Security and Ceasefire Commission; and a Governance, Justice and Economic Commission. Thailand should host the opening rounds because it already facilitated 2026 contacts and has the strongest immediate interest in border stability. The ASEAN Special Envoy would chair or co-chair the political process. China would be a formal guarantor-observer with a defined role in security compliance, not the author of the constitutional settlement.

3. An Interim Federal Order That Immediately Limits Naypyitaw

Within six months, the parties would sign an Interim Federal Order with temporary constitutional force. It would not attempt to answer every permanent constitutional question. Its purpose would be to make the ceasefire governable by establishing who is allowed to do what during transition.

The Order would immediately end the military's automatic legislative quota and its legal entitlement to nominate the Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs ministers. It would prohibit transfer of sovereign legislative, executive

and judicial power to the commander-in-chief through an emergency declaration. It would establish that the president and Union cabinet cannot dismiss state governments or deploy the Union military for ordinary public-order functions except under specified emergency procedures approved by a civilian-majority federal security council.

The resistance would make a major reciprocal concession: the Federal Democracy Charter would be treated as a negotiating input rather than imposed as the final constitution. The current 2026 state institutions would continue temporarily for administrative continuity rather than being dissolved wholesale. Existing law would remain in force unless inconsistent with the Interim Federal Order, preventing the legal vacuum that would otherwise follow a revolutionary change of regime.

4. Immediate Devolution of Day-to-Day Government to States and Townships

The most important substantive transfer would occur early rather than after a distant constitutional convention. Within 12 months, participating states and regions would assume authority over ordinary police, state courts, education administration, health administration, municipal services, most land administration, agriculture, local roads, cultural affairs and agreed licensing functions. Township governments would receive statutory budgets and authority over markets, sanitation, local permits, local development and community safety.

In resistance-controlled areas, existing local administrations would not simply be abolished. They would be converted into recognised interim public institutions after registration, financial disclosure and compliance with the civilian-protection code. In government-controlled areas, Union departments performing functions transferred to states would be administratively reassigned rather than purged. This is a practical integration model: use the officials and systems that already work, change who they answer to, and remove parallel coercive chains.

The transfer should be asymmetrical and performance-based. A state with an established administration may assume functions rapidly; a weaker state may request temporary Union technical support. The Union would not be permitted to withhold authority simply because a state lacks perfect capacity. Capacity would be built after transfer, with auditing and service-delivery benchmarks.

5. A Three-Layer Security Architecture: Union Defence, State Police and State Territorial Guards

The security compromise must avoid both extremes: a permanently political Tatmadaw controlling the whole country, and permanent independent ethnic armies exercising sovereign military authority. The proposed end state has three layers. First, a Union Defence Force responsible for external defence, strategic installations and specified federal missions. Second, professional state police responsible for ordinary law and order. Third, State Territorial Guards in selected conflict-affected states, built largely from existing EAO/PDF structures and limited to territorial defence, border support, disaster response and emergency reinforcement.

State Territorial Guards are a deliberately pragmatic transitional institution. They recognise that major EAOs will not disarm into a national military they do not yet trust. Guards would remain based in their home states, retain light weapons and selected defensive capabilities, and be funded transparently through state and Union budgets. They would not possess independent air forces, long-range missiles or authority to conduct operations outside their state without a jointly authorised mission. Over time, individuals could transfer to the Union Defence Force, state police or civilian life, but the Guard structure could remain as a reserve institution where locally necessary.

The Tatmadaw's concession would be deeper than a change of name. The commander-in-chief - currently General Ye Win Oo - would be legally subordinate to a civilian Union Defence Minister and a National Security Council with a civilian majority. [8] The armed forces would lose legislative seats, political-party functions, ordinary policing authority and commercial regulatory privileges. Senior appointments would require civilian confirmation. The resistance concession would be acceptance that there is one constitutional defence system and that armed organisations cannot retain unlimited independent war-making authority indefinitely.



Figure 9. Armed personnel amid conflict-damaged housing, illustrating the need to transition local armed authority into accountable security institutions. (Source: Instagram)

6. A Federal Revenue and Natural-Resource Compact

The peace agreement should settle money early because armed conflict is sustained by revenue as much as ideology. Within nine months, the parties would adopt a transparent interim fiscal formula. States would receive guaranteed monthly transfers based on population, need, conflict damage and service responsibilities. They would retain state taxes and an agreed share of natural-resource revenue. The Union would receive sufficient revenue to fund national defence, macroeconomic stabilisation, interstate infrastructure and equalisation.

For negotiation, the 40/40/20 production-revenue formula proposed above should be used as a starting point: 40 percent producing-state share, 40 percent Union share and 20 percent equalisation share. It is intentionally simple enough to understand and amend. A separate mechanism would compensate communities directly affected by extraction and infrastructure. No armed organisation, military-owned enterprise, ministry or state authority would be permitted to retain off-budget resource income after an agreed transition period.

Border trade would be regularised rather than abruptly centralised. Existing EAO or military checkpoints would be converted into jointly administered customs points over 18-24 months, with revenue entered into the federal fiscal system. This gives armed organisations a path away from informal taxation without collapsing local revenue overnight. China, Thailand and India would be asked to recognise only registered customs points after the transition deadline, creating a powerful external incentive to comply.

7. Law, Courts, Police and Administration Before National Politics

The settlement should make institutional normality an explicit benchmark. A township is not 'pacified' merely because shooting has stopped. It should have a functioning police station, a court or recognised judicial circuit, a detention register, a budget, a complaints process, a land-record mechanism, a system for business licensing and a known authority responsible for local roads, water, health and schools.

During the first 24 months, international assistance should therefore concentrate heavily on local administrative capacity rather than political campaigning. ASEAN states could provide police, customs, disaster-response and civil-service training; Singapore and Malaysia could support financial administration and commercial regulation; Indonesia could share experience from post-conflict decentralisation and Aceh; Thailand could support border administration and health systems. These are regional institutional tools, not attempts to impose a foreign ideology.

A Federal Inspectorate would audit whether state police, courts and administrations meet minimum procedural standards. Its role would not be to run local government. It would investigate unlawful detention, systematic

corruption, diversion of public funds and refusal to enforce Federal Constitutional Court rulings. State institutions would otherwise be accountable primarily within their own legal systems.

8. A Transitional Union Government, With Elections Delayed Until the State Is Governable

The 2026 government cannot simply be treated as the final post-war political order, but dismantling the state apparatus at the start of negotiations would create a vacuum. A 36-48 month Transitional Union Government should therefore preserve administrative continuity while redistributing political authority.

President Min Aung Hlaing could remain as transitional head of state for a limited period only if he signs and implements the Interim Federal Order, accepts the end of military political privilege, and exercises no operational military command. This is likely to be one of the most controversial concessions for resistance actors, but it provides the Tatmadaw with a face-saving route into institutional transformation rather than forcing the military leadership to choose between total defeat and continued war. The office would be constrained by a coalition cabinet and a Transitional Federal Council containing government, SCEF, state/federal-unit and independent representatives.

National elections should be conditions-based rather than scheduled to satisfy an external timetable. The minimum conditions should include at least 12 consecutive months of substantial ceasefire compliance across most of the country; functioning state administrations; freedom for lawful political organisations to operate; release or legal resolution of prisoners covered by the settlement; a workable voter-registration system for displaced persons; and an election commission acceptable to the principal parties. A target window of 36-48 months is reasonable. Elections held earlier should not be treated as proof of peace.

States should be permitted to establish transitional legislatures and local-selection mechanisms earlier where conditions allow. This reflects the core principle of the paper: national political perfection should not hold local government hostage. Stable local institutions can become the foundation on which a later national political order rests.

9. Prisoners, Accountability and a Separate Rakhine-Rohingya Settlement Track

A peace bargain needs a workable boundary between reconciliation and impunity. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar reported in 2026 that serious international crimes continued to be committed, documenting patterns of military aerial attacks affecting civilian homes, schools, religious buildings, displacement camps and medical facilities, while also investigating serious alleged abuses by non-state armed groups. [20] A blanket amnesty for all conduct would therefore be neither credible nor sustainable.

The settlement would create three categories. People held solely for peaceful political activity would be released and convictions expunged. Lower-level conflict offences that do not amount to grave international crimes could receive conditional amnesty in exchange for truthful disclosure, demobilisation where applicable and non-recidivism. Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and specified serious offences such as systematic torture or sexual violence would not receive blanket amnesty. The same rule would apply to Tatmadaw, EAO and PDF personnel.

Rakhine requires a dedicated sub-agreement because the conflict there involves the Union state, the ULA/AA, Rakhine political aspirations, Rohingya security and citizenship, and Bangladesh. The Rakhine track should therefore include ULA/AA, Rohingya representatives, the Union, Rakhine civilian leaders, Bangladesh and UNHCR/ASEAN observers. It would address freedom of movement, legal status and citizenship pathways, property claims, policing, local representation and conditions for voluntary, safe and sustainable refugee return. Federal autonomy for Rakhine cannot be a licence for local majoritarian domination; equally, a Union settlement cannot be used to reimpose central military administration over Rakhine by default.

10. ASEAN-China Guarantees: Security First, Normalisation in Stages

The agreement requires external guarantees because the parties have decades of reasons not to trust each other's promises. The guarantor architecture should be Asian and functional. ASEAN would provide the political umbrella, observer mission, humanitarian coordination and normalisation incentives. Thailand would act as principal facilitator and logistical host. China would provide the most important coercive guarantee in the north and northeast

because it has already shown the ability to broker ceasefires, influence border trade and pressure armed actors. [14][15]



Figure 10. ASEAN's 2026 regional framework would be central to monitoring, facilitation and staged normalisation under the proposed settlement. (Source: Instagram)

China's guarantee should be written narrowly. Beijing would commit to support the agreed ceasefire, discourage cross-border military resupply intended to enable renewed offensives, keep recognised trade channels open to compliant local authorities, and use its relationships with northern armed organisations and Naypyitaw to address violations. In return, the settlement would protect lawful Chinese trade and infrastructure from arbitrary seizure and establish a joint mechanism for project security. China would not receive a veto over Myanmar's federal constitution.

ASEAN would establish a Normalisation Ladder. Verified 30-day de-escalation and humanitarian access would trigger expanded technical engagement. Adoption of the Interim Federal Order, meaningful detainee releases and functioning monitoring would trigger restoration of broader ministerial participation. Full political re-engagement at summit level would follow sustained ceasefire compliance and functioning transitional institutions. This converts diplomatic recognition into a staged incentive instead of giving it away before reform occurs.

The Core Bargain in Plain Terms

The Core Bargain in Practical Terms

Meaning of the Union. Tatmadaw/current government: Accept a genuinely federal state and loss of routine control over local government. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Accept one continuing Union and no unilateral permanent armed sovereignty. *ASEAN/China: Guarantee territorial settlement process; do not impose constitutional content.*

Military role. Tatmadaw/current government: Keep a national defence institution, but lose political veto, reserved seats, ordinary policing and constitutional guardianship. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Accept a reformed national military and eventual common defence system. *ASEAN/China: Condition military assistance and normalisation on civilian-command benchmarks.*

Local security. Tatmadaw/current government: Transfer ordinary law and order to state police; accept territorial guards in agreed states during transition. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Register forces; limit territorial guards; end independent offensive operations outside agreed areas. *ASEAN/China: Monitor ceasefire; support professionalisation and border arrangements.*

Resources. Tatmadaw/current government: Give states protected tax bases and a major share of local resource revenue; end opaque military extraction privileges. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Bring EAO taxation, mining and border revenue into audited public systems. *ASEAN/China: Recognise only agreed customs channels; support transparent reconstruction finance.*

Politics. Tatmadaw/current government: Accept that the 2026 institutions are transitional, not the final legitimacy settlement. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Accept administrative continuity and time-limited participation by current authorities. *ASEAN/China: Stage political recognition against performance, not titles.*

Justice. Tatmadaw/current government: Release non-violent political detainees; no blanket immunity for grave crimes. Resistance/ethnic authorities: Same accountability standard applies to resistance abuses. *ASEAN/China: Support evidence preservation, ICRC access and technical justice mechanisms.*

The political bargain can be reduced further. The Tatmadaw gives up the right to govern the country simply because it is the Tatmadaw. Ethnic and resistance forces give up the right to remain permanent autonomous armies simply because they won control of territory. Naypyitaw gives up excessive centralisation. States give up unilateral sovereignty. In return, each receives an institutionally protected sphere in which it can survive without needing to destroy the others.

A Myanmar Recovery Fund should open after the Interim Federal Order is signed. China, ASEAN members, Japan, India, international financial institutions and Western donors could contribute through separate windows, avoiding a requirement for political unanimity among donors. Reconstruction disbursement would prioritise roads, power, health, schools, demining, communications and local administration and would be conditioned on audit and ceasefire compliance.

Implementation Sequence: 0-48 Months

Days 0-30. Framework Declaration; local stability pacts; halt attacks on protected civilian locations; ICRC detention access; initial detainee releases; open humanitarian corridors; establish negotiating commissions. *Test for moving forward: Measured reduction in civilian-harm incidents and functioning local incident hotlines.*

Months 2-6. Recognise SCEF plus other negotiating seats; map force areas; deploy ASEAN observers; negotiate Interim Federal Order; begin local governance transfer plans; create fiscal working group. *Test for moving forward: Signed Interim Federal Order and agreed maps/monitoring arrangements in participating theatres.*

Months 6-12. Transfer police/justice/administrative functions in compliant states; establish state budgets; begin 40/40/20 interim resource formula; register armed formations; create territorial-guard pilots. *Test for moving forward: Local institutions functioning without routine Union military control; force registration substantially complete.*

Months 12-24. Form Transitional Union Government/Federal Council; expand state police and courts; convert checkpoints to customs points; begin integration/demobilisation options; launch Rakhine track and Recovery Fund. *Test for moving forward: Sustained ceasefire, falling parallel taxation, increased civilian movement and trade.*

Months 24-36. Draft permanent federal constitution; settle residual boundaries/competences; broaden fiscal system; reduce heavy weapons in local forces; build independent election administration. *Test for moving forward: Constitutional text agreed by principal blocs and security architecture operating under law.*

Months 36-48. Ratification process; national/state elections if conditions met; full ASEAN normalisation; final security-integration phase; long-term reconstruction compact. *Test for moving forward: Legitimate succession mechanism functioning without armed intervention.*

Monitoring, Enforcement and Reversibility

The agreement should avoid the common mistake of treating every violation as either irrelevant or grounds for total collapse. Obligations should be graded. Local incidents would be investigated and corrected locally. Serious operational violations - for example repeated air strikes on protected locations or an EAO offensive across a mapped boundary - would trigger a 72-hour joint review and temporary suspension of associated benefits. Strategic violations - an attempted military seizure of Union political authority, repudiation of the Interim Federal Order, or organised expansion of an armed group outside agreed territory - would trigger guarantor-level action and possible suspension of normalisation, reconstruction payments and border privileges.

The Joint Ceasefire and Stability Commission should issue short factual findings rather than political communiques. ASEAN observer teams would verify incidents where access is possible; satellite imagery and commercial data could supplement field access. China would maintain liaison officers for northern sectors but not control the monitoring database. A separate Federal Implementation Board would track transfer of government powers, budgets, police, courts, detainee releases and fiscal commitments.

Benefits should be automatic when benchmarks are met. One reason peace processes fail is that a party performs an irreversible step and then waits for a political reward that is withheld for unrelated reasons. If a state registers its forces, removes unauthorised checkpoints and meets civilian-protection standards, the corresponding fiscal transfer and trade normalisation should occur automatically. Reciprocity must be visible.

Principal Risks and Spoilers

A military faction may prefer controlled war to loss of political privilege

The hardest concession for the Tatmadaw is not ceasefire; it is accepting that national defence no longer entitles the military to determine the political order. Officers who believe federalism equals national disintegration may resist even if battlefield conditions favour talks. The answer is not rhetorical reassurance. The settlement must demonstrate that the Union retains defence, currency, foreign affairs, strategic infrastructure and an enforceable territorial-integrity framework. Professional military careers, pensions and institutional continuity should be protected for personnel not excluded by serious-crime processes. Institutional survival is the incentive for depoliticisation.

Resistance fragmentation could produce multiple peace processes

SCEF is a meaningful development but not a single chain of command. [4][6] Some armed organisations may prefer bilateral arrangements with Naypyitaw or China; others may reject any accommodation that leaves Min Aung Hlaing or the Tatmadaw intact. The federal design therefore needs to be attractive even to actors that distrust the NUG: real local security authority, resource revenue and constitutional protection are more likely to unite disparate organisations than a demand that they accept a common national party programme.

Decentralisation can create local authoritarianism and criminal economies

Local power is not automatically benign. Some armed authorities already tax trade, regulate movement and administer justice with limited external scrutiny. Resource decentralisation can also intensify corruption if revenue becomes the property of local elites. The settlement therefore pairs autonomy with public budgets, audits, courts, common customs rules and federal prohibitions on private detention, trafficking and off-budget armed finance. A strong federal state must be capable of enforcing these minimum rules without taking back every local competence.

Rakhine can derail a national agreement

A centre-versus-resistance bargain that leaves Rohingya rights, ULA/AA authority and Bangladesh's refugee burden unresolved would not constitute national peace. The 2026 IIMM report described continuing investigations into serious alleged abuses by both state and non-state actors in Rakhine. [20] The Rakhine sub-agreement therefore has to proceed in parallel with the national process and cannot be postponed until after the constitutional settlement.

Premature elections or premature normalisation can remove negotiating leverage

The current government argues that the 2025-26 election created a new political stage, while ASEAN continues to treat the Five-Point Consensus as relevant. [7][17][18] If regional states grant full normalisation without structural concessions, Naypyitaw's incentive to federalise will decline. If resistance actors insist that no engagement can occur until their preferred end state is accepted, the government has little reason to negotiate. Staged normalisation is therefore not diplomatic ambiguity; it is the mechanism that keeps both sides moving.

Why the Main Actors Could Rationally Accept the Settlement

Why the Tatmadaw could accept it

The military would lose political supremacy, but it would avoid institutional defeat. It would remain the core of a national defence force, retain professional command functions during a transition, preserve careers and pensions for most personnel, and obtain a constitutional guarantee that Myanmar remains one Union. It would gain a route to regional political normalisation, reconstruction, restored trade and a reduction in the manpower and financial cost of a war it has not been able to end. The alternative is continued conflict in which international investigations, sanctions exposure and domestic military losses continue regardless of whether the Tatmadaw regains some territory.

Why the resistance could accept it

The resistance would not obtain complete revolutionary victory. Min Aung Hlaing and the current state apparatus could remain involved for a limited transition, the Tatmadaw would survive, and ethnic forces would eventually accept common constitutional security arrangements. In return, the resistance would obtain something that battlefield victory alone may not reliably produce: irreversible transfer of powers away from Naypyitaw, recognised local administrations, state police, fiscal authority, a share of resource revenue, phased security integration and an external guarantee against unilateral recentralisation.

Most importantly, the resistance would not disarm first. Its security concessions would follow the creation of local institutions and constitutional limits on the centre. That sequencing is likely to be the minimum credible assurance for commanders who have decades of experience with ceasefires that did not resolve political authority.

Why China and ASEAN could accept it

China's primary interests - border stability, trade, infrastructure, suppression of cross-border criminality and avoidance of state collapse - do not require Myanmar to be highly centralised. A functioning federation could protect those interests better than an indefinite multi-front war, provided the Union retains external treaty authority and recognised border-management rules. ASEAN would gain a regional solution anchored in its own Five-Point Consensus but made more operational, while Thailand would reduce refugee, trafficking, security and economic spillover along its long border.

Assessment and Recommended Negotiating Position

Myanmar is not yet at a conventional peace conference. Fighting remains intense, civilian harm remains high, Naypyitaw has not recognised SCEF as a collective negotiating partner, and the resistance itself is fragmented. The IIMM reported in August 2026 that military aerial attacks on civilians had intensified in the period leading to the 2025-26 election and documented serious abuses by multiple actors. [20] A ceasefire therefore cannot be assumed simply because diplomatic contacts have increased.

The strategic case for negotiation is nevertheless credible. The military has shown that it can survive but not that it can recreate uncontested national control. The resistance has shown that it can seize and govern territory but not that it can destroy the national armed forces or impose one political programme on every EAO. China has demonstrated the ability to influence northern ceasefires; Thailand and ASEAN have reopened political contact; and SCEF has

moved from revolutionary coordination to publicly accepting the possibility of a negotiated political solution. [14][15][5][6][17]

The most important adjustment to conventional peace thinking is to stop treating the national government as the place where every problem must be solved. Myanmar's peace should be built by reducing the number of issues over which armed actors need to fight for control of Naypyitaw. If police, schools, land, local courts, health administration, local revenue and much natural-resource governance belong to states, the stakes of controlling the Union government become lower. The centre remains important, but it no longer determines the daily political and cultural life of every community.

That is also why strong local leadership and strong institutions have to be considered part of the security settlement, not a later development programme. A ceasefire in a township without a functioning authority creates a vacuum; a functioning township with police, courts, revenue, services and recognised leadership creates order. The same principle applies upward to states. Federalism succeeds when it makes government closer, clearer and more enforceable - not when it merely creates more political offices.

The recommended negotiating position is therefore to frame the peace process around a single proposition: Myanmar remains one sovereign Union, but sovereignty inside the Union is constitutionally divided. Naypyitaw governs only what must be national. States govern most of daily public life. The Tatmadaw defends the Union but does not rule it. Local armed organisations become police, territorial guards, federal soldiers or civilians rather than permanent independent armies. ASEAN and China guarantee that no party can reverse the bargain cheaply.

Bottom line. The objective should not be to make Myanmar conform to an external theory of good government. The objective is a country in which people know who governs them, which law applies, which police force has authority, where taxes go, how disputes are resolved, and which armed institution is allowed to use force. A decentralised federal settlement offers the most realistic route to that kind of peace because it turns Myanmar's diversity from a reason to fight for control of the centre into a constitutional fact the centre is required to respect.

Proposed Ten Commitments - Short-Form Settlement Text

- The parties shall enter locally enforceable civilian-protection and de-escalation arrangements, facilitate humanitarian access and begin reciprocal detainee transparency and releases.
- The Union government and Tatmadaw shall recognise an inclusive collective negotiating structure including SCEF and other indispensable armed and civilian actors; no participant is required to accept another participant's final constitutional programme in advance.
- An Interim Federal Order shall limit Union power during transition, end automatic military political privileges and define protected state and township competences before permanent constitutional negotiations are completed.
- States and federal units shall assume primary responsibility for ordinary policing, state courts, education, health administration, land, municipal services, local development and agreed taxation and licensing functions.
- Myanmar shall maintain one constitutional national defence system, supplemented by professional state police and, where agreed, state territorial guards with limited defensive mandates; no armed institution shall possess an independent right to determine the political order.
- Natural-resource, border and tax revenue shall be brought into audited federal and state budgets under a negotiated sharing formula, with producing areas receiving a protected share and poorer areas supported through equalisation.
- Law-and-order institutions, courts, civil administration and service delivery shall be treated as peace benchmarks and built before national electoral deadlines are imposed.
- A time-limited Transitional Union Government shall preserve administrative continuity while sharing power and preparing a permanent federal constitution; national elections shall occur when security and institutional conditions allow credible participation.

- Political detainees shall be released according to agreed categories; conditional amnesty may apply to lesser conflict offences, but grave international crimes shall not receive blanket immunity; Rakhine and Rohingya issues shall be resolved through a dedicated parallel compact.
- ASEAN, Thailand and China shall guarantee implementation through monitoring, facilitation, border leverage, humanitarian access, staged normalisation and reconstruction incentives, while the constitutional content of the settlement remains Myanmar-owned.

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